

SECRET

DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE  
**Security Committee**

SECOM-D-132

12 June 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Deputy Director of Central Intelligence  
Director, Intelligence Community Staff /s/ 12 JUN 1984  
Deputy Director, Intelligence Community Staff /s/

FROM:

Chairman

25X1

SUBJECT: Leaks (U)

REFERENCE: DCI Memo, same subject, dated 8 June 1984 (ER-84-2547/2)

1. This memorandum provides responses to the questions in paragraph 2 of reference. Work will begin immediately on a broad review of the whole issue of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence. (OUO)

2. The status of leak investigations in CIA, including the use of the polygraph, reflects a firm, deliberate approach. Since January 1983, the Office of Security has processed more than 182 reported publications of classified CIA information. Evaluation of these articles resulted in 74 cases (40.6%) being authenticated as actual leaks. All were internally investigated by the Office of Security and reported to the Office of General Counsel for referral to the Justice Department. (S)

3. Since 1978, six Agency employees have been identified as having made unauthorized disclosures to the news media. In three of these cases, key information was developed through polygraph examinations. Two of the six resigned and the others received administrative penalties. (S)

4. Questions concerning the unauthorized disclosure of classified information are an integral part of both the entrance on duty (EOD) and the reinvestigation program (RIP) polygraph examinations. Security indoctrination stresses protection of classified information from unauthorized disclosure. (S)

SECRET



S-107

SECRET

5. The broad dissemination of intelligence ensures that only rarely is there a small enough number of suspects in a leak case to permit the effective use of the polygraph. In 1983, only one leak investigation, conducted in conjunction with the FBI, included use of the polygraph. In 1982, however, two of the six individuals cited earlier were detected through EOD polygraph examinations. (S)

6. Analysis of trends and patterns in the publication of unauthorized disclosures is contained in the OS submission for this report (Tab A). The publications and reporters most active in the process are predictable, with

25X1

25X1  
 25X1  
 25X1  
 Nine disclosures of classified arms control intelligence were published in the past 18 months. OS has asked OGC to request the Justice Department to review  articles on arms control as a package. The Chief of the Arms Control Intelligence Staff has offered to brief Justice attorneys to assist their perspective on arms control leaks. (S)

25X1

9. The control and reporting of press contacts is under continuing review by the Office of Public Affairs, and  reports the program is working well. The system produces 10 to 12 reports per year of press contacts seeking information from CIA employees. These generally appear innocuous. Reports of casual contact with media representatives, at social functions or as neighbors, etc., are more frequent but do not involve requests for information. (C)

25X1

10. Occasionally, OPA receives reports from CIA employees that newsmen were referred to them by colleagues in other agencies. OPA has agreed to try to determine the identity of the referring party in future cases. We should then advise the supervisors and security officers of these individuals that such referrals, while not direct violations of security, are certainly indiscretions to be avoided. (C)

25X1

SECRET

SECRET

12. In revealing that he has been pointed toward CIA sources by officers in other agencies, [ ] specifically mentioned the State Department. I have sent to George Lauder for coordination a draft of a note to the Director, INR, requesting that he advise his analysts that such referrals may unintentionally facilitate efforts of journalists to obtain and publish classified information. A similar advisory to other NFIB members might also be considered. (C)

25X1

13. At PFIAB, Fred Demech advises that their effort on leaks is in its infancy. Leo Cherne will be in Washington on 19 June and wants to discuss leaks with Messrs. Williams, Baker, Foster and Dr. Wheelon, if they are available. Mr. Williams' law firm is drafting a legislative proposal on leaks. The PFIAB expects to discuss leaks at its July meeting. Subsequently, an advisory for the President will be drafted. Any statement prepared by the PFIAB will be coordinated with you. (S)

14. Clair George advises that OLL continues to work with the Congressional oversight committees on ways to ensure the protection of classified intelligence material. (OUO)

15. Additional items on unauthorized disclosures:

a. SECOM expects the completion of coordination of its leak study within a few weeks. The study will show, among other things, that from FY 1979 through FY 1983, a large number of unauthorized disclosures of classified intelligence was published; that the number of disclosures was increasing; and that the time between production of intelligence reports and media publication of their contents was decreasing. The report should help in raising awareness of the nature and extent of the leak problem.

b. In an effort to continue the work begun by the leak study and to provide a way to conduct meaningful collection and analysis of data on current publications of unauthorized disclosures, the Director, IC Staff has requested the FBI to assign an officer to SECOM to institute an ongoing leak analysis center. We are also seeking to contract with [ ] to assist in this project. [ ] former curator of the Historical Intelligence Collection, was a security analyst for many years and has a deep interest in and knowledge of media publications regarding intelligence matters.

25X1  
225X1

c. In addition to the possibility of a PFIAB legislative proposal on leaks, the American Bar Association and the SSCI staff both are attempting to draft legislation to deal with the problem.

d. The SECOM recently published a report on the utility of the polygraph, describing cases in which individuals with serious disqualifying factors would have been given access to sensitive national security information if it had not been for the polygraph.

SECRET

e. The counterleak presentation, using the videotape you made in July 1983 and excerpts from the PBS television feature on government secrecy and freedom of the press, has been given by [redacted] and me 25X1 about 32 times to a total of about 1400 people. The program has been well received, but is becoming dated, due to the examples used and the emphasis on NSDD-84. It is recommended that you consider making a new videotape. [redacted] 25X1

Attachments:

- A. OS Leak Report
- B. SECOM Memo to DDCI

SECRET

**Page Denied**